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Colombia – Not So Unusual After All 
A case study on the transnational  
making of the boundary between  
‘defence’ and ‘public security’
Manuela Trindade Viana
Abstract
Colombia is often mentioned as an anomaly within the expected framing of defence and public security, an anomaly that 
arises from a faulty division of labour between the police and the military. In this chapter, I offer a different interpretation: 
I use Colombia as an entry point to analyse the processes through which the boundary distinguishing ‘defence’ and ‘public 
security’ has historically been built. The argument unfolds in two parts. Firstly, I analyse how counterinsurgency was raised 
to a privileged position in the Colombian military doctrine in the second half of the 20th century. The second analytical move 
looks at the dynamic between the United States and Colombia in the making of a counterinsurgency a la colombiana and 
inscribes this dynamic in the hemispheric circulation of military savoirs. By dissecting the main direction of transmission in this 
circuit, I show how defining Colombia as a ‘malfunction’ in the division of labour between police and military is misleading, as 
it does not account for the transnational impact on what has come to constitute ‘defence’ in Colombia. Moreover, the framing 
of Colombia as an anomaly avoids questioning the assumptions upon which disputes of anomaly/normality rest. I argue that, 
by focusing on the circulation of military savoirs, it becomes apparent that the domains of public security and defence are 
not only constitutively merged, but also transnationally so. This claim is important, given that the boundary separating these 
domains came to characterise a central part of our institutional imaginaries of democracy since the 20th century, and perhaps 
more strongly since the late 1980s in Latin America.
Introduction
In March 2015, in an interview1 I conducted in the Colombian Superior War College 
(ESDEGUE, in Spanish), I was told that Colombian defence and public security came to 
be organised as inextricably associated spheres due to the armed conflict: ‘Without basic 
internal security conditions, it is not possible to turn our attention to traditional defence 
issues, for the integrity of  the Colombian territory has been under threat for decades’. 
The connection made here between defence and public security points to the latter as 
a condition of  the former: the violence of  the armed conflict prevents the Colombian 
military forces from performing their ‘traditional’ defence role. It also suggests that the 
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military would only be able to perform their traditional role in a post-conflict scenario, 
when threats to the Colombian territory and population cease to exist, as there would 
be no longer be a need for the military to engage in public security. This could be seen 
as an attempt to justify an anomaly within the expected framing of  defence and public 
security, one arising from a faulty division of  labour between the police and the military 
in Colombia. 
However, I offer a different interpretation. Instead of  viewing the boundary between 
defence and public security in Colombia as flawed, I use it to problematise the recurrent 
framing of  this country as an anomaly in terms of  the division of  labour between the police 
and the military (as in Rouquié, 1984; Pizarro, 1987a, 1987b; Atehortúa & Vélez, 1994; 
Vargas, 2003; Ciro & Correa, 2014; Velásquez, 2015). Importantly, my objective here is not 
to justify and defend the involvement of  the military in Colombian public security matters. 
Rather, my point is that the framing of  the problem as such misses the fundamental 
question regarding the assumptions upon which disputes about Colombia’s status as an 
anomaly rest.
The objective of  this chapter is to use Colombia as an entry point to analyse how the 
boundary between defence and public security has historically been built. I argue that by 
focusing on the military savoirs – technical knowledge whose authority derives from the 
experience in a specific professional domain – it becomes apparent that public security 
and defence are not only constitutively merged, but also transnationally so. In other 
words, public security and defence are intertwined, not as a Colombian idiosyncrasy, but 
globally through the circulation of  military expertise, or military savoir. This claim is of 
fundamental importance, given that the boundary separating those domains came to 
characterise a central part of  our institutional understanding of  democracy since the 20th 
century – perhaps more strongly since the late 1980s in Latin America, when the region 
was going through a so-called “re-democratisation” processes.
One might say that using Colombia as a case study to argue that the boundary between the 
terms is blurred is an easy task, for nothing else can be expected from a country where the 
Military Forces have for decades been engaged in public order affairs. However, my point 
is precisely that we cannot understand how the spatial and functional limits of  defence 
have been historically constituted without looking at Colombia in the broader context of 
military savoirs in the hemisphere – what I call a ‘circuit of  military savoirs’ (Viana, 2017). 
In the next pages, I show that it is key for us to grasp how the role of  Colombian military 
professionals in public security as defence has been defined.
The argument unfolds in two parts. First, I analyse how counterinsurgency attained a 
privileged position in Colombian military doctrine in the second half  of  the 20th century. 
I focus on the Colombian Army2 as the branch of  the military forces which, throughout 
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the second half  of  the 20th century, has more systematically been the focus of  the military 
savoirs here analysed. In this process, it becomes clear that we need to bring the United 
States (US) to the fore if  we want to identify how the national security doctrine took 
shape in the making of  defence policy in Colombia, and thus also of  public security. The 
emergence of  counterinsurgency as a privileged military savoir helps to understand the 
systematic entanglement of  the Colombian military with public security affairs.
The second aspect of  the analysis looks at the broader context of  military savoirs in the 
hemisphere. Through this, I show how defining the division of  labour between the police 
and military in Colombia as malfunctioning is misleading, as it does not account for 
the transnational influences on what constitutes defence in Colombia. The section also 
looks at Colombia’s recent re-positioning in the hemispheric circuit of  military savoirs. If 
Colombia has been seen as an anomaly when it comes to distinguishing defence from 
public security, what is its status in relation to other countries?
Colombia and the US in the making of a counterinsurgency a la 
colombiana
The literature on the professionalisation of  the military in Colombia associates the 
prominent role of  the army in public security with the close relationship between 
Colombian and US military officers in the second half  of  the 20th century (Rouquié, 1984; 
Pizarro, 1987b; Atehortúa & Vélez, 1994; Leal, 2002; Rodríguez, 2006; Vargas, 2014). What 
are the main features allowing for such a claim, and why is the US used as a reference in 
the Colombian military’s engagement with public security?
In order to address these questions, we need to turn our attention to the 1950s, as it 
was in this period that interaction with the US army started to crystallise into assistance 
programmes, instruction materials, and training programmes. A starting point for our 
discussion is the Korean War (1950-1953), presented by military officers in Colombia 
such as General Álvaro Valencia Tovar, as ‘a source of  extraordinary experiences  […] 
which divides the modern history [of  the army] in two eras: before Korea and after this 
experience, when the army was modernized and learned how to fight accordingly to 
modern concepts’ (Pizarro, 1987b). Although the Korean War was the Colombian Army’s 
first experience in battle with the US military forces, the way it is portrayed in Colombian 
military historiography does not match the occasional character of  interactions with the 
US military prior to the war, or the improvised character of  recruitment.3 Nevertheless, 
this experience was used by military officers as an opportunity for the intensification of  the 
professionalisation of  the army along ‘US lines’ (Atehortúa, 2008:67-70). More specifically, 
high-ranking military officers who returned from the Korean War translated their 
experience into ‘technical’ improvements in the Army (Pizarro, 1987b:32; Leal, 2002:20; 
Rodríguez, 2006).
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For example, General Alberto Ruiz Novoa, who commanded the Colombia Battalion 
No. 1 from July 1952 to June 1953, registered what he considered the main contributions 
from this experience in three different books (1956a, 1956b, 1965). At the tactical level, 
the aspects he highlighted derive from guerrilla warfare, shown in the importance he 
attributes to the role of  infantry, small-units patrol, and training infantry soldiers not only 
for body-combat, but also for long-distance marching, rather than counting on motor 
vehicles for that purpose (Rodríguez, 2006:64). He also pointed to the need to replace 
heavier and costlier non-portable artillery used in conventional warfare, like cannons, 
howitzers, and war tanks (Rodríguez, 2006:65). According to the general, one of  the main 
benefits Colombia could gain from closer interaction with the US army was specifically 
related to psychological operations. He argued that the use of  propaganda, rumours and 
information campaigns could be useful in demoralising communist guerrillas (Rodríguez, 
2006:65-66). It is thus noteworthy that he offered a justification of  the position of  the US 
army as a reference point for professionalisation that was more attuned to the ‘problem 
of  communism’ facing Colombia.
Furthermore, General Ruiz Novoa is known for having conceived the main aspects that 
came to constitute ‘Plan Lazo’, a set of  military operations launched in 1962, when Novoa 
was Minister of  War. Aiming at ‘pacifying’ Colombia, the rationale of  the Plan was that 
violence had social and economic root-causes (Leal, 2002:43). Specifically, ‘the philosophy 
of  the Plan was “to remove the water from the fish”, that is, to remove the peasant’s support 
to the guerrilla’ (Ruiz, 1992, in Leal, 2002:44) through a set of  social and economic policies 
that were added to the military intervention. This tactical component was referred to as 
‘civil-military action’ (acción cívico-militar) by Novoa, in a speech published in 1964 (Ruiz, 
1964:247). In practice, civil-military action in Plan Lazo often involved the distribution of 
pamphlets with information on the mission of  the Colombian army, in addition to very 
occasional services offered by the military in small villages, such as shoe repair and tooth 
extraction. Importantly, the provision of  those services always coexisted with armed 
confrontations and psychological techniques, such as infiltration and torture, aimed at 
gathering information on the insurgents.
The forces participating in Plan Lazo had been trained in irregular warfare in the 
Lancers’ School (Escuela de Lanceros), established in 1955 as a specialised unit of  the 
infantry. Months before the foundation of  the school, a commission of  five Colombian 
high-ranking military officers visited Fort Benning in Georgia, US, in order to attend 
the ‘Ranger Course’ (Leal, 2002:44; Rodríguez, 2006:77). Formalised in 1951 as a specific 
department within the US Army Infantry School, the rangers are agile and flexible small-
unit soldiers engaged in irregular warfare, whose training constituted short-term courses 
based on counter-guerrilla warfare for jungle and urban terrains, instruction on how to 
perform ambush and infiltration, and a set of  exercises focused on physical preparation 
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and resilience (Rodríguez, 2006:77). With the assistance of  the US army’s Captain Ralph 
Puckett, the Escuela de Lanceros was built as a mirror of  the Rangers School in terms of 
training and military procedures.
In an article published in 1959 in the official review of  the US Army Infantry School (Infantry 
Review) and then in the Colombian Revista Militar, it was claimed that the Colombian 
Army’s interest in the Ranger Course derived from the massive presence of  guerrillas and 
bandoleros in specific regions (Puckett & Galván, 1959:94, in Rodríguez, 2006:78):
These irregular groups have been, for a long time, a continuous threat to the 
peace and security of  the Colombian people; being experts on the mountains and 
jungle paths, they are very difficult to find and defeat, and the Army has not been 
successful in dominating them. To overcome this difficulty, it was necessary to put 
forth a specific training program for a special kind of  operation; since small units 
have been used to combat the anti-socials, the solution became evident: selected 
officers and non-commissioned officers had to be trained in order to fight the 
enemy in its own terrain and with its own methods. This was the mission of  the 
Lancers’ School, and it excelled at it.
As the excerpt above shows, the creation of  the Escuela de Lanceros was considered a 
concrete response to a security necessity, given the ‘continuous threat to the peace and 
security of  the Colombian people’. This version of  the national security doctrine became 
the main axis around which defence practices were developed in Colombia. In this context, 
the Escuela de Lanceros excelled in fighting ‘the enemy in its own terrain and with its 
own methods’, not only through the mobility that such irregular warfare required, but 
also a specialised savoir in the terrains that guerrillas and bandoleros were experts on: the 
mountain and the forest. According to a campaign manual dated 1944, translated and 
adapted by the US military mission to the Colombian Military Forces, ‘In the war in the 
jungle, the soldier fights two different enemies: man and nature. Between them, nature is 
often the most impressive one’ (Estado Mayor General de las Fuerzas Miltares. República 
de Colombia, 1944:5). 
Such a statement has two main implications. Firstly, it highlights the reliance on the 
‘native population’. In order to make the soldiers more familiar with the hostile conditions 
of  the jungle, the manual instructs troops to count on ‘carefully selected local guides, 
whose loyalty and integrity are undisputable’ (Estado Mayor General de las Fuerzas 
Miltares. República de Colombia, 1944:50). However, while necessary for the military 
to feel safer in a terrain they are not familiar with, the ‘native population’ constitutes 
a potential danger, for there may be enemy infiltration, a risk which a careful selection 
process aims to minimise. Furthermore, according to the manual, ‘The use of  organized 
native troops  … will not only help dissipate any opposition to the presence of  our troops, 
it will also bolster solidarity against a common enemy’ (Estado Mayor General de las 
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Fuerzas Miltares. República de Colombia, 1944:51). The population is thus portrayed as 
either an enemy to be defeated or an asset to be explored so that the operation succeeds, 
constituting a source of  knowledge on the terrain, as well as a source of  intelligence 
and legitimacy.
The second implication of  fighting where and how the ‘anti-socials’ fight is the format of 
the training programme. With the assistance of  the US military, the Escuela de Lanceros 
dedicated a significant part of  its training programme to familiarising soldiers with the 
hostile environmental conditions of  the jungle.4 The first groups who graduated from 
the Escuela de Lanceros were attached to brigades operating in regions considered to be 
‘infested with guerrillas’ (Vásquez & Negret, 1960:60, in Rodríguez, 2006:81). The 1960 
memoirs of  the Minister of  War, Rafael Hernández Pardo (1959-1960), celebrated the 
efficiency of  the lanceros in controlling “subversion” foci in those regions. Within a few 
years, this infantry specialisation constituted the backbone of  Plan Lazo.
The features of  Plan Lazo correspond to the main pillars characterising what we have come 
to know as counterinsurgency (Porch, 2013): (i) an emphasis on tactics, mobility, and the 
small units deriving from it; (ii) a population-centric approach and a ‘winning hearts and 
minds’ motto, due to the idea that the population acts as both the key to the success of  the 
operations and the risk of  infiltration of  the enemy; and (iii) an emphasis on intelligence, 
given the difficulty of  discerning an enemy from an ally in a given population. These 
features remained the main axes guiding military operations in Colombia throughout the 
following decades.
The analysis so far has shown how Plan Lazo was central to the elevation of  counter-
insurgency to a privileged position in Colombian military doctrine, as well as to a more 
systematic interaction with the US in terms of  the professionalisation programme of  the 
Colombian Army in the second half  of  the 20th century. I now turn my attention to 
another fundamental piece in our puzzle: Plan Colombia. On the one hand, the analyses 
about Plan Colombia often underestimate the importance of  the war in Korea and Plan 
Lazo to the consolidation of  the features mentioned above. However, if  understood as an 
important point within a broader trajectory, Plan Colombia is an unavoidable subject if 
we want to discuss the implications of  the so-called “post-conflict” context in Colombia 
for defence doctrine in this country. This is because Plan Colombia takes the features 
mentioned above to another level, in terms of: (i) the intensity of  the relations with the US; 
(ii) the resources mobilised in the Plan; (iii) the areas covered by the specialisation of  the 
military in Colombia; and (iv) the scale of  the professionalisation of  the Colombian Army.
The first two aspects are intrinsically linked. Between 2000 and 2006, US foreign assistance 
to Colombia amounted to US$ 4.7 billion, 80% of  which was concentrated in military 
and police training, equipment, weapons, and vehicles (Isacson, 2006), making Colombia 
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the main recipient of  military aid from the US in Latin America, and the third in the 
world, after Israel and Egypt. Amongst the many ways one can interpret the scale of 
Plan Colombia, one is that the regime of  justification mobilised by the Colombian Army 
evoked a “military crisis” in a context marked by an intensification of  violence in the 
country. Ongoing military defeats to the FARC in fronts considered as strategic by the 
Armed Forces resulted in the claim that military reform was both necessary and urgent 
(El País, 1998; Rangel, 1998; Revista Semana, 1998; Villamizar, 2003). Based on this, the 
Minister of  Defence, Rodrigo Lloreda Caicedo (1998-1999), created the Commission for 
the Restructuration and Modernization of  the Armed Forces in 1998, with the objective 
of  developing a comprehensive reform plan.
One of  the main components of  Plan Colombia was the procurement of  aeroplanes and 
helicopters aimed at strengthening the air power of  the Colombian Army, and based on 
this, 74 helicopters were supplied by the US, and additional ones were procured by the 
Colombian government (Vargas, 2014:140). Four years after Plan Colombia had been 
implemented, Colombia had the third largest fleet of  helicopters in the Americas, after the 
US and Brazil (Villamizar, 2003:50). As of  2003, the police and military forces in Colombia 
had 230 helicopters, of  which 30 are of  the assault kind, mostly produced in the US (Black 
Hawk, Bell, Huey, and Hughes) (Villamizar, 2003:51).
If  Plan Lazo was characterised by the specialisation of  the combat forces within the 
Colombian Army, this specialisation was further deepened with Plan Colombia, and 
organised according to different criteria: (i) the geographical characteristics of  the 
Colombian territory, as in the case of  the four Mountain Battalions (Batallón de Alta 
Montaña); (ii) specific skills mobilised by military operations, as in the four Mobile Brigades 
and the Rapid Deployment Force (Fuerza de Despliegue Rápido – FUDRA, in Spanish); and 
(iii) the category of  threat, as in the case of  the Counternarcotic Brigades (Brigadas Contra 
el Narcotráfico – BACN, in Spanish).5
Amongst those specialised forces, the BACN is emblematic of  how the US engaged with 
training in the context of  Plan Colombia. Created in 1999, the Counternarcotic Battalions 
were trained by the 7th Group of  US Special Forces in Fuerte Tolemaida.6 The training 
programme combined a focus on physical preparation with the familiarisation of  the 
soldiers with terrains such as the jungle and mountain, highlighting the persistent relevance 
of  the rangers in the irregular form of  warfare characteristic in Colombia.7 What is 
important in Plan Colombia in this regard is the explicit incorporation of  counternarcotic 
policies into military expertise – a domain which until then had been part of  the scope of 
the Colombian National Police (Vargas, 2012).
Finally, an additional key feature of  Plan Colombia was how quickly it expanded the 
manpower of  the Colombian Army, predominantly through “professional soldiers” 
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(soldado profesional), those who, after having concluded the mandatory military service 
(18-24 months), decided to remain in the Military Forces, receiving specific training and a 
salary for their work (Villamizar, 2003:61). In 1998, there were 22,000 professional soldiers 
in Colombia, while by 2002 there were 55,000 (Vargas, 2014:141). The increase stemmed 
from the so-called Plan 10,000, issued in 1999 with the objective of  substituting 10,000 
“regular soldiers”8 for the same number of  “professional soldiers” each year until 2001 
(Villamizar, 2003:61).9 The short-term process in the conversion of  a regular soldier into a 
professional soldier allowed for the rapid increase of  combat soldiers in Colombia: most 
professional soldiers were incorporated into the Counter-guerrilla Battalions (BCG, in 
Spanish) and Mobile Brigades (BRIM, in Spanish) (Villamizar, 2003:61-62) after a 14-week 
training programme.10
Preparing thousands of  soldiers for combat required dedicated infrastructure, and the 
School of  Professional Soldiers (ESPRO, in Spanish)11 was created in December 1999, 
based in Nilo (Cundinamarca), offering training facilities and short-term courses focusing 
on the physical preparation of  soldiers. Interestingly, the polishing of  those who were 
to become instructors in the ESPRO was undertaken in Fuerte Tolemaida,12 which was 
founded in the department of  Cundinamarca in the 1950s, during general Gustavo Rojas 
Pinilla’s administration (1953-1957). Under Plan Colombia, Fuerte Tolemaida received 
massive investments aiming at developing its infrastructure and transforming it into a 
centre of  excellence in military training.13
This analysis of  Plan Colombia highlights the re-definition of  counterinsurgency in 
Colombia so as to encompass counterterrorism and counternarcotic tactics in a more 
systematic way. More recently, as Colombia claims to have overcome the violence of  the 
late 1990s, these domains correspond to the military savoirs the Colombian Army has 
been increasingly taken as a reference for to its counterparts in Latin America. In the 
next section, we describe the transnational influences leading to defence being viewed as 
public security in Colombia and discuss how the country has come to enjoy a privileged 
position in more recent years.
The circulation of military savoirs in the Americas and the recent 
re‑positioning of Colombia
In mapping the main defence practices of  the Colombian Army in the second half  of  the 
20th century, the previous section revealed a fundamental aspect: the role of  the US Army 
as an example for the Colombian Army in the structure, organisation, and execution of 
their professionalisation programmes. In this section, I argue that this is a specific example 
of  a broader circulation of  military savoirs in Latin America,14 which also characterises 
the US as a diffusion hub, and counterinsurgency as the most valorised concept. For us to 
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grasp the texture of  this circuit, we need to identify the main mechanisms through which 
these military savoirs circulate: the military schools operating as diffusion sites; courses 
taught and manuals useds in those schools; military missions travelling from one country 
to the other in the hemisphere; and specific military doctrines.
The hemispheric circulation of  military savoirs started to gain shape in the 1940s, in the 
context of  the Cold War, and contributed to synergies between military forces across 
the Americas. For example, the organisation of  regular meetings and competitions and 
the creation of  permanent commissions on specific topics allowed for the exchange 
of  doctrine and instruction materials, along with the comparison of  forces (such as 
equipment and personnel), the design of  cooperation mechanisms, the articulation of  a 
“common” agenda, and networking. These practices are shared, compared, and discussed 
in inter-American institutions: the Inter-American Defense Board, the Organization of 
the American States (OAS), and the School of  the Americas (SOA). Such an institutional 
system – and the interactions it allowed for – has two main effects. Firstly, it contributed 
to the harmonisation of  military savoirs throughout Latin America during the second half 
of  the 20th century. Secondly, its weight created a reluctance to change the direction of 
this harmonisation.
A closer look at the SOA will illustrate this point. Colombia only figured prominently in 
the student population of  the SOA from the 1970s onwards (Gill, 2004:74).15 Between 1970 
and 1979, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Honduras, Panama, and Peru sent between 1,100 and 
1,800 students each, accounting for 63% of  total enrolment in the School (Gill, 2004:78). 
Returning from those courses in the SOA, Latin American military officers often had 
the content of  the material translated into Spanish/Portuguese, so that it could be used 
as reference for the courses taught in their home countries (Gill, 2004:99). This form of 
knowledge sharing has continued: in the second half  of  the 20th century, training manuals 
on counterinsurgency were created in Fort Levenworth, and then translated to Spanish at 
the SOA (Gill, 2004:54).
As the definition of  what constitutes a threat was developed through the decades, the 
configuration of  the SOA changed, both in terms of  the courses offered and in student 
demographics. For example, while the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the US 
Army Special Warfare School sent their civil and military professionals to the SOA to teach 
Latin American students, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the Federal Bureau 
Agency (FBI) undertook similar practices as drug trafficking increasingly became seen 
as the main threat facing the Americas by the 1980s. In terms of  the student population, 
Mexico, El Salvador and Colombia accounted for 9,000 students in the 1980s – 72% of 
the total student population (Gill, 2004:83). However, it was only in the 1990s that the 
Colombian Armed Forces – both police and military personnel – attended specific courses 
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on drugs at the SOA. The SOA Watch database16 illustrates the changing curriculum 
offered by the SOA, as well as revealing For instance, the “Patrol Operations” course, 
attended by 129 low-rank military officers17 and non-commissioned officers (suboficiales) 
from Colombia during the 1980s, disappeared as such in the following years.18 Only 30 
high-ranked Colombian officers19 attended courses at the School from 1960 to 1989. 
Similarly, some of  the courses were “tailor-made” for a specific state or group of  states – 
as in the case of  “Jungle Courses”.
On one hand, the best-attended courses in a given historical context might suggest a 
transformation of  military savoirs throughout the second half  of  the 20th century. On 
the other hand, the changes mentioned above are all organised under a broader category 
of  military savoir: counterinsurgency. The transformations identified must thus be read 
as a re-articulation within a specific military savoir or, more specifically, as refinements 
in counterinsurgency tactics based on contextual interpretations of  what “insurgency” is 
being combatted, and information on how this “enemy” operates. In other words, the 
changing curriculum during the second half  of  the 20th century is not a transformation 
of  military savoirs in the same way as the displacement of  conventional warfare by 
counterinsurgency in mid-20th century Latin America.
There is another fundamental aspect related to the courses offered in military schools 
such as the SOA since the second half  of  the 20th century. As shown above, while the US 
enjoys a position of  authority in the diffusion of  counterinsurgency to other countries 
in the hemisphere, the tactical refinements and adjustments point to the agency of 
Latin American military professionals in this process. Since the mid-20th century, the 
US Army has indeed been the reference point for others in the region when building 
their professionalisation programmes. However, this does not imply a unidirectional flow. 
As mentioned above, there is a demand-driven component to courses taught in these 
institutions, an institutional response to what was considered a priority by key military 
partners in the region. Indeed, the circulation of  Latin American military officers amongst 
these schools allowed for a solid hemispheric network of  military professionals, as well 
as the legitimisation of  the discourse on the “threats” facing societies in the hemisphere, 
contributing to the fabric of  military institutions in those countries.
Enabling this circulation of  Latin American military professionals was one of  the remarkable 
features of  the history of  this institutional fabric. For instance, the economic constraints 
facing many Latin American states since the end of  the 1970s led to a significant decrease 
in the number of  students at the SOA. As an effort to facilitate the flow of  students by that 
time, in 1976 the Gerald Ford administration initiated the International Military Education 
and Training (IMET) programme, funding the training of  foreign troops (Gill, 2004:78). 
By the 1980s, when many Latin American states were immersed in economic crises, these 
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resources funded Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), small teams formed by US military 
officers who trained troops in situ (Gill, 2004:75, 85). With time, this came to constitute 
the main platform through which military training was provided in Latin America.
As shown in the previous section, military missions were also important channels through 
which military expertise on intelligence and irregular combat (the lanceros, for instance) 
were transmitted. The format of  such missions varied in duration (the 1962 intelligence 
mission to Fort Holabird lasted for 8 months, for instance) and scope (to attend a course, 
to instruct troops, to create a military school and build its curriculum, etc.). As in the 
case of  the Escuela de Lanceros, the purpose of  the US military mission to Colombia was 
not only to crystallise a savoir on irregular warfare in the form of  a specialised school, but 
also to create the conditions for the transmission of  that savoir. It was for this reason that 
a group of  high-ranking military officers visited the facilities at Fort Benning to attend 
the “Ranger Course”, making sure that they were in a position to teach others when they 
returned. Importantly, the SOA was only one of  the destinations for Colombian military 
personnel to familiarise themselves with a specific technique, domain or doctrine.
This circuit of  military savoirs seems to have changed in recent years, with Colombia 
coming to operate as a hub for the diffusion of  military knowledge in the region. In Fuerte 
Tolemaida from 2009 to 2013, the Colombian Army and Colombian National Police 
trained 10,310 professionals from Mexico; 3,026 from Panama; 2,609 from Honduras; 
1,732 from Guatemala; 1,132 from Ecuador; 510 from Peru; 465 from El Salvador; and 
377 from Costa Rica (Tickner, 2014:3). In April 2013, the Escuela de Lanceros, one of  the nine 
training schools in Fuerte Tolemaida, concluded its 367th course, resulting in the training 
not only of  Colombian military professionals, but also of  582 international students from 
19 different countries (including Brazil, Canada, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Peru and 
the United States) (CENAE, 2013). These numbers reveal that other countries in the 
world, and particularly in Latin America, have come to take Colombia as a reference in 
the training of  their military and police units in counterinsurgency. Colombia’s position 
in the circuit of  military savoirs is predominantly based around Fuerte Tolemaida, a facility 
whose modernisation and transformation into a centre of  excellence in military training 
relied on significant shares of  the resources from Plan Colombia.
However, the re-positioning of  Colombia in the Latin American circuit speaks not only 
to the range of  courses that came to attract attention from other armies in the region, 
but also to a specific category of  military professional. For example, ESPRO, the school 
specialising in preparing soldados profesionales through short-term courses focused 
on irregular warfare, appears as a key destination for military personnel in the region. 
The most-attended courses on ‘tactical military operations against illegal organisations’ 
include elite units; mobile units; explosive units; demolitions; and demining (ESPRO, n.d.). 
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In this sense, ESPRO trains soldiers in both the highly-ramified specialisation that came to 
characterise the Colombian Army, and a form of  “professionalisation” in other armies in 
Latin America. Being the only school of  its kind in South America, ESPRO has received 
students from Brazil, Chile, China, Israel, Paraguay, Peru, the United Kingdom (UK) and 
the US (ESPRO, n.d.) 
The training of  Latin American military professionals in Colombia in recent years is a 
result of  the country overcoming the problem of  insurgency in its territory, and now 
being in the position to teach others based on its expertise. In the words of  the Minister of 
Defence (2011-2015) at the time in Colombia, Juan Carlos Pinzón (2015:8):
Because of  the sustained progress since the turn of  the century, and their exceptional 
expertise and experience, the Colombian Armed Forces are well positioned to 
evolve into a regional leader in training, education, and actively participate in 
international peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief  missions 
around the globe. Colombia’s experience successfully combating insurgent 
groups, illicit facilitators, transnational criminal organizations, and drug trafficking 
organizations, makes it uniquely capable and qualified to assist other nations that 
today, or one day, may face similar threats.
Of  course, it is important to explore how this re-positioning of  Colombia affects the 
privileged position that the US has enjoyed in the hemisphere for so many decades. 
Although this is outside the scope of  this chapter, it is noteworthy that this recent dynamic 
is more like a trilateral organisation – preserving the US as a key piece in this arrangement 
– than a full displacement of  the US as the main authority on counterinsurgency. Two 
elements arising from my fieldwork in Colombia20 account for this hypothesis. Firstly, the 
Colombian Ministry of  Defence reserves a whole section of  its main building in Bogotá 
for military staff  from the US. Second is the significant numbers of  military instructors 
and high-ranked military officers from the US going to Fuerte Tolemaida and the Superior 
War College (ESDEGUE, in Spanish) respectively.
For the purposes of  this chapter, however, the main argument emphasises another aspect 
in this dynamic, which is the boundary allegedly differentiating defence from public 
security. In the introduction to this chapter, I highlighted that Colombia is repeatedly 
framed as an anomaly for the practices undertaken by its Military Forces which are not 
considered part of  a traditional defence agenda. According to this understanding, the 
historical and systematic engagement of  the Colombian Army with public security 
constitutes a problem in terms of  the principles underlying the differentiation of  defence 
and public security.
Within these terms, Colombia’s position as an authority in the region in recent years 
leads to a puzzle, as even countries whose military forces are not seen as anomalies, such 
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as Chile, France, and the UK, have been learning from Colombia’s experience in public 
security matters. In post-conflict Colombia, the debate on the role the Military Forces 
can perform in peacetime reinforces the need for the Colombian National Police to take 
the lead in internal affairs. Along with this, the Colombian Army should emphasise civil-
military action which, as we have seen, is not that different from counterinsurgency, and 
export its expertise to ‘nations that today, or one day, may face similar threats’ (Pinzón, 
2015:8). Thus, if  Colombia is considered to be a post-conflict context, but the “disturbing” 
participation of  the military in public security continues, the position of  the country as 
a provider of  solutions to counterinsurgency operations must be taken as an analytical 
puzzle. As the analysis here shows, Colombia’s position in a broader circuit of  military 
savoirs suggests that the term “anomaly” should apply to the whole hemispheric circuit, 
not just to Colombia. However, this is tantamount to saying that we should question the 
standard of  normality against which this so-called anomaly is assessed.
This chapter has problematised the supposed boundary between defence and public 
security. By offering an account of  how military savoirs circulate in the hemisphere, it 
highlighted that defence and public security are transnational social constructs. Accordingly, 
the labelling of  Colombia as an anomaly when it comes to traditional defence practices 
is challenged, because it makes it difficult for us to identify the historical processes that 
resulted in a specific contextual understanding of  defence. It is not a matter of  shifting the 
responsibility for “problematic” institutional design from Colombia to the US, for we must 
also recognise the agency of  Colombian military professionals in the history of  military 
savoirs. Similarly, we cannot limit our understanding of  public security to a given space or 
function, precisely because it requires broader definitions of  internal and external.
Final remarks
What are the assumptions behind the boundary we draw between defence and public 
security? This chapter has taken up this question through a focus on Colombia as an 
analytical point of  entry. What makes Colombia relevant as a case study is the recurrent 
framing of  the country as an anomaly in light of  persistent and pervasive engagement of 
the Military Forces with public security. This chapter has a twofold argument.
First, I explored how it is necessary to account for the active role of  the US Army in the 
emergence of  counterinsurgency as the main military savoir guiding the engagement of 
the Colombian Army with public security. I argued that it is impossible to understand the 
Colombian Army’s notion of  defence without including the US Army in the analysis. My 
second move involved looking at this interaction within a hemispheric circuit of  military 
savoirs. The influence of  the transnational idea of  defence as public security on Colombia 
points to the limits of  confining the anomaly to a specific territorial context. After all, 
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the blurred boundary between those two domains stems from the relation between US 
and Colombian military professionals, a dynamic which itself  is inscribed in a circuit of 
military savoirs.
Furthermore, exploring the circulation of  military savoirs in Latin America in the second 
half  of  the 20th century allows us to more closely examine the common valorisation of 
counterinsurgency as more relevant to the “threats” that the military in the hemisphere 
were believed to be facing. Importantly, however, the re-positioning of  Colombia 
in the circuit of  military savoirs does not refer exclusively to the military. In the post-
conflict context, both police and military professionals from other countries have sought 
Colombian expertise to solve the problems they claimed to be facing.
In this sense, the chapter displaces the spatial (from Colombia to the circuit) and temporal 
(from internal war to post-conflict) lenses through which we frame “problems” in the 
supposed boundary between defence and public security. This transnational perspective 
of  how the military came to perform public security functions in Colombia is thus of 
fundamental importance if  we are to question the notion of  the two as distinctive spheres 
of  policy, involving contrasting tasks and different professionals of  the public force. 
Considering the position of  authority that such a boundary enjoys in our beliefs about 
democracy, the discussion here acquires particular significance, and particularly in Latin 
America, where militarisation has increasingly been debated.
One might say that a key aspect is the transformation of  warfare. Indeed, the multiple 
forms that counterinsurgency has taken all share at least one constitutive element: the 
population-centric approach. This is an essential component, for it is this element that 
leads to an inherent confusion between police and military functions. If  we accept 
counterinsurgency as a central tenet of  defence on the one hand, and public security on 
the other, then we must also be prepared to accept the modalities of  war that constitute 
social ordering practices in our daily lives.
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Notes
1 The interview took place in ESDEGUE on 9 March 2015. Personal information about the interviewee 
are not public, under the request of  the interviewee. For more details on the content of  the interview, 
however, please contact the author: m.trindadeviana@gmail.com
2 The Colombian Armed Forces are constituted by the Military Forces (Army, Air Force, and Navy) 
and the National Police.
3 Indeed, at least 15 volunteers joined the Battalion right before it departed to Korea: although they 
were formally enlisted, many of  them did not have any previous military instruction (Atehortúa 
Cruz, A.L., 2008:66).
4 Its main course comprised a twelve-week instruction, structured into four phases. The first one was 
a six-week course focused on the physical preparation of  the soldier through military gymnastics, 
fencing with bayonet, personal defence, swimming, and survival. During this period, the soldier was 
also taught on intelligence and tactics, as well as on how to read aerial-photographic maps, to work 
with explosives, and to lead. The second phase (two weeks and a half ) corresponded to patrolling in a 
flat, jungle terrain, where the soldiers were given eight different counter-guerrilla missions. In the two 
weeks constituting the third phase, the soldiers patrolled in mountainous terrains and participated in 
technical and tactical exercises on how to prepare and protect from an ambush. Moreover, in this part 
of  the course, the soldiers engaged in combat simulations, with a mission, a target, and a weapon, 
and were trained on how to jump on the river with their equipment and uniform. In the final week 
of  the Lancers’ Course, the soldier went through several tests on command, patrol and physical 
resistance (Rodríguez, H., 2006:80).
5 It is important to mention that this process had been accelerated since the 1980s, in the context of  the 
intensification of  the “war on drugs”. Indeed, in 1985, the Colombian Army created the Urban Anti-
terrorism Special Forces Group (Agrupación de Fuerzas Especiales Antiterroristas Urbanas – AFEUR, 
in Spanish), with the objective of  countering and neutralising terrorist actions in the main urban 
areas of  Colombia. In 1996, the Army created the Unified Action Groups for the Personal Liberty 
(Grupos de Acción Unificada por la Libertad Personal – GAULA, in Spanish), exclusively dedicated to 
avoiding and finding solutions to practices of  kidnapping and extortion. Currently, the FUDRA, the 
AFEUR, the GAULA, and the BACN are 4 of  the 6 Special Forces of  the Colombian Army. For more 
information, see https://bit.ly/3aPpysq [Accessed 7 September 2018].
6 Currently, the Brigade is constituted by three maneuver units (BACN No. 1, 2 and 3), and one support 
unit – the Counternarcotic Services and Support Battalion (Batallón de Apoyo y Servicios Contra el 
Narcotráfico – BASCN, in Spanish), responsible for the provision of  materials, budget and logistics to 
the maneuver units (Ejército Nacional de Colombia, 2017).
7 The training programme is constituted by four pillars. The first one involves a technical preparation 
in which the soldier learns how to master weapons and equipment such as compass, GPS and night 
vision devices, as well as techniques such as how to build an improvised vessel. In this phase, soldiers 
are also trained on “ranger operations”. The second pillar corresponds to training on physical tactics, 
including physical resistance exercises such as marching, trotting and training in specific formations 
(polygonal) and self-defence, in addition to the emphasis on swimming for river crossing and rescue. 
The third component of  the training programme is focused on the psychological preparation of 
the soldiers, mainly through simulations on how to deal with situations under pressure. Finally, 
the programme aims at familiarising the soldiers with the legal frameworks on human rights and 
humanitarian law. In this last phase, the courses instruct soldiers on how to deal with local authorities, 
and how to proceed with invasion, capture and confiscation.
8 The category “regular soldier” refers to a military professional whose career is prepared from the basis in 
the Escuela de Cadetes (School of  Cadets). In the latter, the military students remain for 4 to 5 years, 
as the starting point of  the military career programme for the low-ranked military in Colombia.
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9 The category “regular soldier” refers to a military professional whose career is prepared from the 
basis, in the Escuela de Cadetes (School of  Cadets). In the latter, the military students remain for 
4 to 5 years, as the starting point of  the military career programme for the low-ranked military 
in Colombia.
10 See https://bit.ly/2w6kYr5 [Accessed 15 September 2018].
11 See https://bit.ly/3aSMFlW [Accessed 15 September 2018].
12 Ibid.
13 In this context the fortress had its name changed to National Training Center (CENAE, in Spanish). 
Currently, Fuerte Tolemaida has nine schools specialized in lancers (ESLAN), military parachuting 
(ESPAM), army tactics (ESERT), support and services for training (BASEN), special forces (ESFER), 
professional soldiers (ESPRO), shooting (ESTIR), high mountains (ESAMO) and jungle (ESSEL). For 
more information, see http://www.cenae.mil.co/ [Accessed 15 September 2018].
14 Actually, we could also picture it as a global phenomenon. Porch (2013), for instance, shows how 
military professionals from France and the United Kingdom travelled to the United States in the 1960s 
so as to engage in conversations on how their experience could be mobilized in counterinsurgency 
tactics that were being advanced by the United States in Southeast Asia. In a book edited by Arielli 
and Collins (2012), a compilation of  chapters reminds us how the circulation of  military professionals 
is not a phenomenon confined in a specific geography, nor in a specific time frame.
15 According to Gill (2004:74), after the Cuban Revolution, the SOA had a 42% increase in the number 
of  students in comparison to the 1950s. During the 1960s, when the SOA was transferred from Fort 
Benning (United States) to Fort Gulick (Panama), 13,500 students attended courses at the School. 
Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Panama, and Peru represented the greatest shares: from 1960 to 1969, 
between 1,000 and 2,000 trainees were sent by each of  these states. 
16 https://bit.ly/2WeJG36 [Accessed 17 February 2017].
17 From Second Lieutenant (Subteniente) to Major (Mayor).
18 From 1978 to 1988, the course was attended by 823 Latin American students.
19 From Lieutenant Colonel (Teniente Coronel) to General (General). However, only Lieutenant Colonels 
and Colonels attended courses at the SOA in the period mentioned above.
20 My fieldwork involved interviewing military professionals from diverse ranks in the Ministry 
of  Defense and military schools in Colombia. Focused on the training and schooling of  military 
personnel, I also had access to specific manuals which were used in those schools. The work 
comprised four 15-day visits to Bogotá from 2014 to 2016.
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